On The Goodness of Being
According To St Thomas

by G Deegan

Classical Metaphysics considers the proposition "everything is good" a fundamental insight of far-reaching significance into the nature of being itself. However, in modern philosophy as well as in twentieth century literature this principle is at times rejected. Kant viewed transcendentals as 'empty' terms. Modern authors are somewhat critical of the axiom of the goodness of things and point, for example, to the reality of evil and suffering which in no way can be called good. Existentialist authors believe that things in themselves have no value but only receive a value when man is interested in them.

The concept of ontological goodness goes back to Plato and Aristotle. Aristotle defines the good as that which all things desire. But the content of this well-known definition is already present in Plato's dialogues: "The good is that which for the sake of which we must do everything else". (Gorgias, 499 c). Plato made perfection and the final causality of the good the very centre of his philosophy.

Before dealing with God's goodness in his "Summa Theologiae" Aquinas first determines what exactly goodness is, what its essence is and in what it differs from being. A text from Augustine; namely, we are good to the extent that we are", serves as a beacon in the analysis (De doctrina christiana", I, 42).

The essence, the content of the concept of the good, consists in the fact that the thing of which the term good is predicated is desired. Indeed, Aristotle says that the good is that which all things strive for. A simple reflection shows how correct this definition is: all strivings and desires seek a good. Hence we may say that the good works like a magnet on all existing things; it is the end they try to reach; it is the object of love in all its forms. While Plato conceived the good as one unified and univocal supreme entity and principle (the Idea of the Good) Aristotle pointed out that the good is manifested as it is found in the different categories of being. St. Thomas integrates the sober and solid analysis of Aristotle into an entirely new metaphysics of creation and participation to recuperate and transpose the valuable elements of Plato's theory of the Good.

It is evident that a thing is desirable to the extent that it is perfect, since all things strive for perfection. Now everything is perfect to the extent that it has been brought to reality ('in quantum est actu'). Hence a thing is good to the extent that it is being. Being is the reality of each thing and gives it its most profound determination, viz. that of being real. Hence it is clear that good and being are the same in things. But good expresses desirability - something that being does not express.

St. Thomas points out that a thing cannot simply be said to be good in the same way that it is called being. Being is said in the first place of the substantial being of things, and only secondarily, in a more limited sense, of the accidental being, which is added to a substance. But because goodness of its nature implies perfection it is attributable most of all to that by means of which a thing attains its perfection. Now this occurs more through accidental determinations, such as health, development of the mental faculties and virtues; being the end desired by other things also ranks high in what we call being perfect. Perfection presupposes unity: the more unified something is the more perfect it becomes. This means that the good is not just the static possession of one's ontological content and perfection, it is also that which is still to be attained. Creatures and in particular man must further develop and perfect themselves. In this way the good also shows the character of a fullness of being still to be reached.

The thesis that every being is good casts light on the particular nature of metaphysics. At the level of daily life it is far from being the case that all things are good for us, in the sense of the things desired or loved by us. But the metaphysician has a different approach and looks beyond the immediate goodness for us at this particular moment; he does not remain fixed on a particular class of good things. He considers beings for what they are and is convinced that each being possesses its own content and perfection on the basis of which it deserves to be valued and loved. God's creative love gives this content and value to things.

Aquinas next raises the question as to whether our knowledge of good precedes our knowledge of being: being is the first concept we form. It is the most proper object of the intellect and hence the content of being precedes that of the good. This answer implies the rejection of the Neoplatonic thesis of the priority of the good over being. St. Thomas does concede that in a limited sense and from a particular point of view the good may precede being; namely, in the area of causality. The good is also in a certain sense desired by that which is still in potency; in this sense we can say that it extends itself even to that which is not yet altogether being.

St. Thomas demonstrates as follows that every being is good inasmuch as it is being. For every being, inasmuch as it is being, has actuality and is perfect in one way or another. For every act is a certain perfection. Now as is apparent from what was stated above, the really perfect is desired and good in its content. Hence every being as such is good. (I, 5, 3). In his answer to the objections Aquinas makes the following observation: 'good' does not add a particular thing to being, but merely expresses the character of desirability which follows from the nature of being. Accordingly no being as such is evil. It can only be called so if it lacks something. With regard to primary matter Aquinas observes that it is only potentially good.

In his doctrine of the truth and goodness of being St. Thomas observes that being of itself goes towards man and gives itself to him. Man's nature is such as to impel him to accept and to love being. The good is a final cause because it is desirable. However, he adds that in the person who acts the final cause acts first but in things which become the good is reached only at the end of the process of becoming.

The principle that good spreads itself ('bonum est diffusivum sui') must be understood exclusively of final causality. Likewise Augustine's words "Because God is good we exist" ('De doctrina christiana, I, 31) must be interpreted as referring to the final causality of God's will. St. Thomas rejects the explanation of the above-mentioned principle through efficient or, a fortiori, mechanic causality. On the level of efficient causality the good is not active, for it is in the nature of the good to perfect other things in the manner of the end. Needless to say that Aquinas does not deny that good things also act as efficient causes. But this does not imply that the good as such is an efficient cause. The Platonic principle of the good spreading itself tends to reduce the causality of the good to a necessary natural activity, just as for the Neoplatonic philosophers the emanation f the hypostases is indeed a necessary process which they illustrate by the image of a gushing well or a source radiating light.

In a following article of his treatise on the good in the 'Summa Theologiae' St. Thomas inquires on the basis of a text from Augustine ('De natura boni', c. 3) whether the content of the concept of good consists in mode, shape and ordering ('modo', 'specie', 'ordine'). He explains his positive reply as follows: in order to be good a thing must be perfect. Now it acquires the character of perfection through its form. In order to determine a thing a form must be applied to that which is to be determined. This need for adaptation is expressed by the term 'modus'. The form itself is denoted by the term 'species', because a form constitutes a thing in its kind. The inclination towards the good follows from the form and is represented by the term 'ordo'. In this text St. Thomas clarifies what may be called 'the immediate surroundings' of the good: the preparation for the good by means of the receiving subject and the adaptation of the efficient cause, the formal content of the good which realizes itself differently in each case, and the resulting striving towards the goal of the good thing once it is constituted. In this way Aquinas leaves behind a static view of the good and sees the good in development, in its specific riches and its striving which characterizes all things.

In the last article of this question, St. Thomas [presents] the traditional division of the good into the morally good, the useful and the pleasant ('bonum honestum', bonum utile', 'bonum delectabile') This division goes back to Aristotle who writes that our choice is determined by three things; namely, the good, the useful and the pleasurable (Eth. Nic. 1103 b 30 ff).

In conformity with this division Aristotle also distinguishes three kinds of friendship: friendship based on considerations of utility, friendship based on pleasure and finally noble, perfect friendship based on mutual assistance towards moral progress (Eth. Nic. VIII, c. 3). St Thomas observes that this division is applicable in the first place to human actions, but that when it is seen from the higher standpoint, it also concerns the ontologically good. This is explained as follows: the good is the goal of desire, thus of movement.

Finally, the question must be answered whether all things are good due to God's goodness. In Plato's philosophy the answer is plainly affirmative. Aristotle, however, sharply rejected the theory of a univocal participation in a supreme Idea of the Good. St. Thomas makes a distinction: Plato's doctrine of ideas which postulated that the essences of things exist outside those things must be rejected. Things possess their own essence. But, on the other hand, it is absolutely true that there is a First Being which is being and good through its essence and which we call God. Aristotle also holds this, says St. Thomas. Every being receives its being and goodness from this First Being, which is being and good through its own essence. All things participate in the First Being in the manner of a remote likeness which is given to them by God as efficient cause. In this way everything is good due to God's goodness. After this strong affirmation of the doctrine of participation St. Thomas points out that things possess their own goodness because their likeness to God's goodness is present in them as their very being and must be called formally their own goodness.

This article posted Dec 2005. It was published in Universitas Number 12 (Dec 2005)
Permission is granted to copy or quote from this article, provided that full credit is given to the author and to the
Centre for Thomistic Studies, Sydney, Australia.
We would be grateful to receive a copy of any republication.

Centre for Thomistic Studies | Article Index | Recommended Books | Recommended Links